Abstract-Empirical evidence suggests that in practice it is difficult to reach Pareto optimal agreements in negotiations. In this paper, we take a constructive approach to this question in two-party negotiations over continuous issues. A new negotiation procedure is presented that results in Pareto optimal agreements under fairly general assumptions. The procedure uses a mediator who assists the decision makers (DM's) by choosing jointly beneficial compromises. The procedure has the appealing feature that the DM's are only required to answer relatively simple questions and their individual utility functions need not be identified completely. Moreover, the DM's reveal minimal private information to the mediator. These are properties that we would hope to have in practical procedures to be incorporated in operational negotiation support systems.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Pareto Optimal Agreements
I
T IS often argued that fully rational decision makers (DM's) should reach Pareto optimal agreements in negotiations. Yet, experience suggests that finding and agreeing on joint gains can be difficult and that negotiations often result in inefficient agreements. As Raiffa [29, p. 358 ] puts it, "often, disputants fail to reach an agreement when, in fact, a compromise does exist that could be to the advantage of all concerned. And the agreements they do make are frequently inefficient: they could have made others that they all would have preferred." Certain cognitive and socioemotional factors, such as tension and antagonism, have been proposed as possible explanations to this departure from what would be expected (e.g., [13] and [15] ). Whatever the reasons for this inefficiency may be, there is an obvious interest in and a need for negotiation procedures that help DM's reach Pareto optimal agreements.
The textbook solution to ensuring Pareto optimality is straightforward. Since both DM's know their own preferences as well as the preferences of their opponent, all Pareto optimal agreements, i.e., the contract curve, can be readily calculated. After that, the DM's face a distributive negotiation over the contract curve. But this approach is not necessarily feasible.
It has been widely recognized that people may be uncertain about their preferences or their preferences may be dynamically changing, and that even if the preferences are stable and precisely defined, it may be difficult to elicit them and construct utility functions (e.g., [5] , [33] , [35] , [38] , and [40] ). Furthermore, negotiations are typically characterized by the fact that the DM's do not fully know each others' preferences; that is, information is incomplete [2] , [29] , [34] . Here we use the term incomplete information in the game theory tradition, in which it refers to lack of knowledge about the structure of a game [16] . In decision theory, incomplete information has also been used to refer to situations characterized by a DM without precisely defined preferences, by incompletely known probability distributions, or by an inexact evaluation of consequences [40] .
In this paper, we present a procedure with which two DM's can search for joint gains and arrive at a Pareto optimal agreement in a negotiation over continuous issues (earlier versions of this paper are [10] and [11] ). The procedure uses an assisting mediator and calls only for local information about the DMs' preferences so that their utility functions need not be identified completely. Furthermore, only part of this local preference information has to be revealed to the mediator. The principle of the procedure is the following. At each stage, the mediator finds out the local set of agreements in which joint gains can be realized and then chooses an agreement from this set. This is done by first choosing a jointly improving direction from the set of all jointly improving directions and then proceeding along this direction to the new agreement. These stages are repeated until a Pareto optimal agreement is found.
We shall discuss the implementation of the procedure in practice as well as provide a mathematical analysis of its properties. In particular, it will be proved that the procedure results in a Pareto optimal agreement.
When choosing an improving direction in the procedure, the mediator has to make a compromise between the DMs' desires. In this paper, we shall consider a simple bisecting compromise direction. We shall also show how the direction choosing problem can be approached axiomatically.
B. Raiffa's Procedure
Our approach has been inspired and motivated by the procedure proposed by Raiffa [29, pp. 156-158] agreement from which the DM's start searching for joint gains. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where the DMs' isovalue curves through are shown. In this particular case, DM1 wants to move southwest while DM2 wants to move northeast. Joint gains can be realized in the lens-shaped region between the isovalue curves.
As an example, Raiffa proposes that DM1, say, first announces some points on his/her isovalue curve through . DM2 then chooses from these points the one he/she prefers most. This will be the next tentative agreement . Next DM2 reciprocates by announcing some points close to and on his/her isovalue curve through it. DM1 chooses one of these as and so forth. Gradually, the tentative agreements approach a Pareto optimal agreement.
Our work differs from that of Raiffa's in the way the moves are made. In particular, in all of the steps of our procedure, both DM's will benefit. We also give an exact convergence analysis.
C. Related Research
A number of practical procedures and negotiation strategies have been proposed for creating joint gains and reaching efficient agreements (e.g., [3] , [14] , [23] , [27] , and [28] ). These include methods such as compromising and horsetrading as well as approaches like principled negotiation. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, little is known about their theoretical properties. Several game theoretic models of bargaining as well as practical bargaining and arbitration procedures are reviewed and discussed by Brams [2] . These include, for example, procedures for reaching a settlement in a buysell situation described as a two-DM nonconstantsum game of incomplete information. These games are essentially of the "win-lose" type; creating joint gains is not an issue. Brams and Taylor [3] have considered the problem of fair division in which different goods have to be allocated among the DM's. Their Adjusted-Winner procedure produces Pareto optimal allocations under certain assumptions about the DMs' valuations about the goods. The Pareto optimal allocations satisfy some other fairness properties as well. These fairness properties are common and frequently used as a starting point when formulating the problems in axiomatic bargaining theory as initiated by Nash [26] and Kalai and Smorodinsky [21] . Mumpower [24] has analyzed the efficiency of compromising and horsetrading in negotiations over two continuous issues (see also [6] ). The author concludes that "... if function forms [utility functions] are concave, compromise strategies tend to lead to settlements that lie on or near the efficient frontier" (p. 1311). He also claims that compromise strategies are frequently observed in studies of negotiation behavior. A normative model of negotiations has been considered in [31] .
There is growing interest in supporting negotiations by some structured methods. Teich et al. [37] tested a heuristic in a realistic two-party resource allocation negotiation. Their directional search method resembles the method examined here in that joint gains are searched for by first finding an improving direction in the issue space and then moving into this direction. However, heuristic rules are used to find the directions along which movements are taken. The aim of the directional search method used is to minimize the number of questions posed. Unlike in our case, no convergence analysis can be given due to the heuristic nature of the approach.
An mathematical programming approach to model negotiations over continuous issues is to use constraint proposals methods [9] , [12] , [36] , [39] . In these methods, the mediator adjusts an artificial plane constraint until the DMs' optimal choices on the plane coincide. Unlike the methods of improving directions, these methods do not produce improving agreements during the iteration. The only thing that can be guaranteed is that the final outcome is Pareto optimal.
It has recently been argued that the methods of multiple criteria decision analysis could also be used in group decision making and in negotiations [20] . A typical setting could be, for instance, consensus seeking in groups facing discrete alternatives [18] , [19] . So far these methods have not been used in settings studied in this paper.
D. Contents
We first describe the negotiation procedure in detail and discuss its practical implementation. In Section III, a mathematical analysis of the procedure is presented. The section ends with a general convergence result. In Section IV, we discuss the problem of choosing a compromise from the set of improving directions. In particular, we show that the bisecting direction is a natural choice if certain reasonable properties are required from the direction choosing mechanism. An example is given in Section V, and conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. NEGOTIATION PROCEDURE
We now set out to describe how the DM's could search for joint gains and finally reach a Pareto optimal agreement. The underlying hypotheses about the situation are the following.
1) There are two DM's assisted by a mediator and facing an integrative negotiation over two continuous issues and . The levels of these issues are denoted by and , respectively; . 2) For any possible agreement encountered during the process, the DM's have well-defined preferences over all agreements "close" to . These local preferences can be represented by concave utility functions.
3) The DM's want to search for joint gains. In order to do this they are willing to give the mediator truthful answers to questions of the type: "which of these two agreements would you prefer?" Furthermore, they are willing to accept tentative agreements proposed by the mediator, provided that the agreements give joint improvements. Let us briefly discuss these hypotheses. First, it is essential that the issues are continuous. This is needed in the mathematical analysis that follows in Section III. In this section, we present a practical implementation of the procedure using discretized alternatives. The mathematical analysis can be extended to multiple issues replacing the requirement by ; the results remain unchanged. However, from the user point of view, the practical implementation becomes increasingly difficult when the number of issues grows. This is because the DM's have to consider and compare an increasing number of alternatives. The theoretical considerations also remain valid in the case of multiple DM's. Nevertheless, the direction choosing problem presented in Section IV should be replaced by a genuine optimization problem, the interpretation of which is not so straightforward as in the two DM case. The assumption about the existence of local preferences, item 2) above, is weak. The third hypothesis is central because it excludes strategic behavior, such as misrepresentation of preferences. Raiffa [29, p. 160] argues that when improvements are sought over a given agreement, "there is a great deal of incentive for each party to act honestly and nonstrategically." Of course, the DMs' willingness to search for joint gains does not fully exclude the possibility for strategic behavior. This question has much been discussed in the game theory literature; see [3, chap 8] and the references therein, where a coordination problem in a "Prisoners' Dilemma" game is discussed. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the information here is incomplete, except that the mediator has access to local information about the DMs' preferences, and consequently, in this case, untruthful revelation of preferences to the mediator can lead to "backfires" in several ways [4] .
We shall next describe the procedure. At each iteration, the procedure generates a jointly improving direction according to an appropriate rule and then determines a move into that direction. Let denote the tentative agreement reached at stage . The starting point is . This can be the prevailing status quo, a natural reference point of the negotiation, or the result of some other agreement. The phases of the procedure are the following.
Step 1: The mediator searches for improving directions by announcing a few points that lie on a small circle around . Each DM informs the mediator which points he prefers over (see Fig. 2 ). If none of the preferred points coincide, is approximately Pareto optimal and the procedure terminates. Otherwise, joint gains can be realized and the mediator proceeds to Step 2.
Step 2: The mediator chooses point from the jointly preferred points. This corresponds to choosing a jointly improving direction.
Step 3: The mediator announces a few points along the chosen direction, i.e., along the line through and , and asks the DM's about their preferences over these points (see Fig. 3 ). One of these is then chosen as the next tentative agreement. The procedure is repeated from Step 1 until a Pareto optimal agreement is found.
In Step 1, we get an approximation to the set of improving directions. Nevertheless, in the theoretical analysis, we must assume that this set is exactly known. This is the case if, e.g., the directions of the gradients are known at the points generated by the procedure.
Which one of the jointly improving points does the mediator then choose in Steps 2 and 3? This could be a problem if, e.g., the mediator is biased. The possible bias a mediator may introduce into a negotiation-arbitration procedure is discussed by Brams in a specific case in [2, pp. 55-56]. Here we assume that the mediator uses some suitable, "generally accepted" rules, or rules accepted just by the DM's themselves, to choose the next tentative agreement. For example, suppose in the vicinity of [e.g., inside a small ball centered at with radius ] the linear approximations for the gains are used (for this only gradient information about the DMs' preferences is required). Then we can solve the direction choosing problem in the payoff space of marginal utilities axiomatically as is done in Section IV. Furthermore, since along the line through and the ratio of the DMs' marginal gains is constant, it is natural to choose the point on the sphere as the next tentative agreement.
III. MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
The negotiation procedure will now be described in mathematical terms. Let us first list some definitions and assumptions. The ranges of issues and will be denoted by and , respectively. We assume that and are closed intervals on the real line, and we denote . The utility function for DM is denoted by . We assume that and are strictly concave and differentiable.
With every point we relate two sets, and , that contain the improving directions for DM1 and DM2, respectively. The sets are defined as follows:
If
, then and DM prefers to for some . We then define , the set of jointly improving directions. The zero vector has been added for notational convenience. This set is associated with the efficiency of in the following way (all proofs have been relegated to the Appendix).
Theorem 1: is Pareto optimal if and only if . The construction of and corresponds to
Step 1 of the procedure described in Section II.
The mediator's choice of a compromise direction (Step 2) can now be described abstractly by a function such that , except possibly for boundary points, and only if is Pareto optimal. It is clear that if is in the interior of , then is completely determined by and . For interior points, we can thus typically write . After a direction has been chosen, the mediator has to choose a point along so that both DM's gain (Step 3). Let us define the function , for as follows [there will be no need to define for ]. Let maximize subject to the constraint , and let . Here is a suitable closed interval. We then define . The meaning of this function is clear. The DM's consider all possible agreements along the line and announce the one they prefer the most. From these, the mediator chooses the one that is closer to the current tentative agreement. This assures that both DM's will gain. The function will be used in the convergence result below. However, the result will remain valid even if a shorter distance is moved at each stage, i.e., can be replaced by where . This means that the complete optimization required by can be replaced by small improvements. The negotiation procedure presented in Section II can now be described with the help of and in the following way:
The iteration stops whenever a Pareto optimal agreement is reached. Notice that here the rule used at Step 3 of the procedure is completely specified by . A possible way of defining the function , i.e., the compromise rule used at Step 2, is discussed in Section IV. It is intuitively clear that this procedure must lead to a Pareto optimal agreement. Because the process continues as long as joint gains can be realized then, eventually, any move would make at least the other DM worse off. In other words, a Pareto optimal agreement has been reached. The convergence of the procedure can be verified in the interior points provided the compromise rule is sufficiently regular.
Theorem 2: Suppose the sequence generated by (1) is bounded, and suppose for all . Then converges to a Pareto optimal agreement.
Two different things can happen here. Either the procedure stops at a Pareto optimal agreement in a finite number of steps or an infinite sequence is generated that approaches the Pareto optimal set. Numerical tests have shown that the process is practically quite close to a Pareto optimal agreement already after a few steps; for a numerical example, see Section V. This is because the procedure is essentially a gradient method, and as is well known, the convergence of gradient methods is fast in the beginning of the iteration.
Except for the assumption about the interior points, the boundary points are not considered here, the convergence result is rather general. As was noted earlier, we can replace by and still retain the result. There is also some flexibility in choosing because so far we only require that it is continuous.
IV. CHOOSING FAIR COMPROMISE DIRECTIONS
A central assumption in Theorem 2 is the continuity of ; that is, the continuity of the function used to choose compromise directions. It is easy to show that such continuous choice functions exist and that if the function is required to satisfy certain reasonable properties it is uniquely defined.
We concentrate on points in the following subset of : (2) Notice that if the DMs' preferences are nonsatiable, then . Furthermore, if for some , then satisfies the first-order conditions for being the global optimum of DM ; that is to say, for being Pareto optimal.
Let us consider the choice function defined by (3) chooses the direction that bisects (see Fig. 4 ). Notice that actually depends only on the directions of , not on their magnitudes. Thus, if only information about the directions of the gradients is available, so that a compromise must be chosen between the unit vectors and , then seems to be a natural choice. Furthermore, since , the bisecting compromise yields (4) so that the marginal gains are always divided at the ratio of the magnitudes of the gradients. We can show that the bisecting direction is always a feasible choice. We next show how to end up in the compromise axiomatically. If only local preference information is available, it is reasonable to think that decisions concerning moves from are made on the basis of marginal utilities , where . Thus, we consider the direction choosing problem in the payoff space of marginal utilities.
There are several ways of using the marginal utility information in choosing a "fair" improving direction from . For example, we could determine the direction that maximizes the minimum of and over some set. Here we take a more general axiomatic approach to solving choice problems, as initiated by Nash [26] .
Formally, we define a two-DM choice problem by (5) where and are vectors in and is constant. Let denote the set of all such choice problems.
We define a choice function to be a mapping that assigns to each an outcome and satisfies 1) Pareto optimality, i.e., is a Pareto optimal point of and 2) homogeneity, i.e., for all . The latter implies that the choice is independent of the constant used to define a particular . Next we define as the Pareto optimal point corresponding to the bisecting compromise. Mathematically, for a given , we define , where with chosen so that [note that the triplet specifies and that depends only on ]. Thus, is the vector that bisects the angle between and and is of magnitude . It is easy to see that, in addition to properties 1) and 2), satisfies 3) symmetry; i.e., if is symmetric with respect to the 45 line, then and 4) scale transformation invariance, i.e., if , then . All of these properties are commonly used in social choice problems [25] . Conversely, it turns out that properties 1), 3), and 4) suffice to determine a unique choice function that is given by . Theorem 4: If the choice function satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, and scale transformation invariance, is the bisecting compromise . Suppose the mediator, or the DM's themselves, were facing the problem of choosing a fair improving direction on the basis of local preference information, and suppose this information only consists of the directions of the gradients. Then the underlying choice function must be independent of the magnitudes of the gradients; i.e., it must satisfy property 4). A Pareto optimal symmetric choice then leads to the bisecting compromise . Using a similar reasoning, we are led to the conclusion that giving up scale transformation invariance another compromise direction, corresponding to the so-called proportional choice function (for the definition, see [32] ), could be obtained. Giving up scale transformation invariance obviously means that full gradient information be available, and it is taken into account when making choices.
V. NEGOTIATION OVER FISHING RIGHTS
As we can witness from the news media, the role of international negotiations is ever more important in today's world. They often deal with the growing global, political, economic, and environmental problems. Analytic approaches could play a useful role in supporting these complex negotiations [30] . The Adjusted-Winner procedure has recently been applied to cases of real-world disputes in international relations, like that between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in 1978 (see Brams and Togman [4] and Brams [2] for an analysis of this case using game theoretic models of bargaining) and that between China, Taiwan, and some other Southeast Asian nations concerning the Spratly Islands (see Denoon and Brams [7] ). Among the many environmental topics, negotiations over fishery rights are of great present interest. When different nations wish to exploit the same natural resource, such as a fish stock, severe disputes can result. An example is the conflict between Canada and the European Union concerning fishing in the Grand Banks area that took place in 1995. Earlier, fishery negotiations have often been analyzed with dynamic game theory techniques (e.g., [8] and [17] ).
Here we consider a negotiation over fishing rights and illustrate how to obtain efficient agreements with the procedure described in the foregoing sections. Suppose that at time there is a stock of fish that two countries harvest. Let and denote the catch of the countries during that period. Obviously the harvest cannot exceed the total stock so that . The countries affect each other through the size of the remaining fish population, the dynamics of which is governed by a growth law, and they wish to maximize their overall discounted utility.
Making some simplifying assumptions, we can construct a one-period model of the situation [22] . In particular, suppose that, if uninterrupted, the fish population would grow according to ( ), that the utility functions of the countries are logarithmic, and moreover, that if there were no future period, each country would get an equal share of the remaining stock of fish. Using these assumptions, the following discounted utility functions are derived in [22] :
Here and are the discount factors of the countries and is the initial stock of fish. The gradients of the utility functions are If the countries optimize their catch along direction at stage , we can show that the optimal agreement for country is given by , where provided that this agreement is feasible. For the numerical illustration, we use the parameter values and assume that the negotiation starts from . This initial position means that roughly 95% of the fish population would be harvested. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 5 , where some isovalue curves of the utility functions are shown. The set of the agreements in which joint gains can be realized is shaded.
Consider then the negotiation procedure (1) with the compromise direction given in (3) . At the first stage, the gradients of the countries' utility functions are and . From (3), we get , which means roughly a 3:2 ratio in cutting down the harvesting of the countries. Next the countries maximize their utilities along and from . The optima are at and , or at and , for countries 1 and 2, respectively. Next the mediator selects the one closer to as the new tentative agreement; hence, . After this, the gradients will be calculated at and so forth. The progress of the iteration is illustrated in Fig. 6 , where the Pareto efficient set is depicted by a dashed line. We see that the procedure is quite fast; the countries are very close to a Pareto optimal agreement already after three steps. At this point, , which means an 11% drop from the original total harvest of 1.2 units.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed a constructive approach to the problem of creating joint gains for two DM's when two continuous issues are at stake. In our procedure, Pareto optimal agreements can be reached by means of a mediator.
The procedure involves choosing a compromise direction. Using an axiomatic approach, we have examined how the compromise directions should be chosen if rationality properties, such as symmetry and scale transformation invariance, are required from the compromise rule. The simple 50-50 split between the DMs' most preferred, or gradient directions, turns out to define a suitable compromise direction. In the two-DM case, this simple rule is self evident. However, if there are more than two DM's, the direct generalization of the bisecting compromise no longer works. This is because the sum of the unit gradients is not necessarily feasible any more. The axiomatic approach now allows us to define the direction choosing problem as a maximization problem over the improving directions. In the special case of two DM's, the solution of this problem gives the bisecting direction.
As was already mentioned in Section II, the theoretical analysis can be generalized to cover the multiple issue and multiple DM cases. Nevertheless, the practical implementation becomes increasingly difficult when the number of issues grows. In this case, the DM's have to consider an increasing number of alternatives. These questions are beyond the scope of this paper and are considered in a forthcoming publication.
The most important topic of future research is the empirical analysis of the proposed procedure. The method can easily be implemented in a computerized negotiation support system. 
